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Mr. Justice Black: Some Passing
Observations
Ronald K. L. Collins*
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: ABSOLUTIST ON THE COURT. By James Magee.
University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia: Pp. 214
(1980), $22.50 (hardbound).
Black and I thought that all of the "balancing" had been done by those
who wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. They had set aside cer-
tain domains where all government regulation was banned. When it came
to certain activities, the Constitution had taken government off the backs.
of men.
William 0. Douglas'
That is the sort of hard-hitting civil libertarian statement Amer-
icans have come to expect from a "Douglas" or a "Black." It is the
sort of declaration that quickens the zeal of a generation of War-
ren Court sympathizers. But, as has been said before,2 one can-
not work with it alone as a proposition of constitutional law.
Unfortunately, Mr. Justice Black's philosophy is remembered
mostly by the catchwords he employed to espouse his constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Fervent admirers delight in the straightfor-
ward simplicity of what they perceive to be a homespun
philosophy. Critics, raged by the catchwords, ridicule as absurd
what they think is nothing more than a mere ipse dixit.
Fortunately, there is an ever growing corpus of legal literature
dedicated to dispelling the popular misconceptions about the ju-
* Judicial Fellow, United States Supreme Court.
1. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 48 (1980).
2. See Kipling, A Talk with Justice Linde, 1980 WESTERN L.J. 9, 20. See also
Dworkin, The Case Against William 0. Douglas, 29 N.Y. REV. OF BooKs 3 (1981)
(arguing that Douglas "had begun the long process of deciding first and finding
reasons later, a process that exchanged philosophical skepticism for philosophical
cynicism.").
ridical testament housed in the 969 judicial opinions 3 of the Jus-
tice who served 34 terms on the Supreme Court. Chief among
these contributions are the writings of Professor Tinsley E. Yar-
brough.4 In the same general vein of careful case examination
comes Professor James J. Magee's Mr. Justice Black: Absolutist
on the Court.5
Magee is now an Associate Professor of Political Science at the
University of Delaware. Although the book does not mention the
fact, Mr. Justice Black is the product of a 1975 Ph.D. dissertation
done at the University of Virginia under the tutelage of the re-
nowned Professor Henry J. Abraham, who, incidentally, signed
the book's foreword. Additionally, as with publications of most
such dissertations by university presses, the research cutoff pe-
riod is three or more years prior to the recorded publication date.
Consequently, and perhaps through no fault of the author, there
are no references to numerous and worthwhile post-1976 secon-
dary sources concerning Justice Black.6
These observations are not, however, intended to be overly crit-
ical of the otherwise informative and at times penetrating work
product contained in Magee's Mr. Justice Black. That is, Magee
takes his readers beyond the catchwords and introduces the
existence and ramifications of several of the more subtle and so-
phisticated jurisprudential aspects of certain important tenets of
Black's "constitutional faith." Put another way, Magee acquaints
his readers with some of those working principles and proposi-
tions that lie at the core of the Alabama Justice's philosophy.
In the premier pages of the book, Professor Magee maintains
that Justice Black "was one of the very few members of the Court
(past and present) who sought diligently and conscientiously to
develop a constitutional jurisprudence which would serve to limit
as well as to justify the exercise of judicial power."7 Magee sets
3. Haigh, The Judicial Opinions of Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black, 9 Sw. U. L. REV.
1069 (1977).
The Justice's conference notes were destroyed at his request prior to his death.
See H. BLACK, JR., My FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 250-51 (1975). However, other pa-
pers and correspondence of the Justice have been preserved and are available in
the Library of Congress (Manuscript Division). Magee's research does not appear
to have drawn upon these papers.
4. Partially listed in Collins, Book Review, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1087 n.2.
5. J. MAGEE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: ABSOLUTIST ON THE COURT (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MAGEE].
6. See, e.g., articles collected in Justice Hugo L. Black: A Symposium, 9 Sw.
U. L. REV. 845-1155 (1977); and Frank, Hugo L. Black: Free Speech and the Declara-
tion ofIndependence, 1977 U. I". L. FORUM 577; Comment, The Right ofPrivacy: A
Black View of Griswold v. Connecticut, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777 (1980); articles
cited in notes 10-12 infra.
7. MAGEE, supra note 5, at xi-xii.
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out to identify and explain that constitutional jurisprudence.
Despite what is suggested by the book's title and the constant
references to Justice Black's "jurisprudence," it is important to
note what is not discussed in Magee's examination of Black's con-
stitutional thought. Absent is any genuine consideration of
Black's views on "absolutism" as applied to interpreting "abso-
lute" provisions like the contract clause.8 Foreign to this study is
any attempt to show how Black tackled "balancing" in the equal
protection context.9 Conspicuously missing is any helpful discus-
sion of the relationship between Black's first amendment views
and those views he held concerning the meaning of the fourth
amendment.l0 Likewise, Magee does not seriously endeavor to go
beyond the "incorporation" stratum of Black's understanding of
due process," nor does he venture upon any extended inquiry
into the Justice's first amendment "absolutism" concerning the
establishment and free exercise clauses.12
I highlight these omissions because it is difficult to understand
how there can ever be a plenary and satisfactory exposition of Mr.
Justice Black's constitutional jurisprudence absent some mean-
ingful discussion of how the Justice's views concerning these sub-
jects and others fit into the scheme of his overall philosophy.
More importantly, I suspect that either Black's jurisprudence met
its hardest test in those areas, or perhaps Black failed to hammer
out a refined approach to resolving certain constitutional ques-
tions within the framework of his total jurisprudence.
These points call to attention perhaps the most tenuous asser-
tion in Magee's book, the assertion made in the first chapter,
namely that "[a]l of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, not just
the First Amendment, [Black) said, contain absolute
8. See, e.g., El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (1965) (Black, J., dis-
senting).
9. See Yarbrough, Justice Black and Equal Protection, 9 Sw. U. L. REV. 899
(1977).
10. See Landynski, In Search of Justice Black's Fourth Amendment, 45 FORm-
HAM L. REV. 453 (1976).
11. See Haigh, Defining Due Process of Law: The Case of Mr. Justice Hugo L.
Black, 17 S. DAKoTA L REV. 1 (1972). For an illuminating expression of the Jus-
tice's constitutional jurisprudence, and specifically his views on due process, see
his seldom read opinion in International Shoe v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
322 (1945) (separate opinion).
12. Compare MAGEE, supra note 5, at 184-87 with D. Meiklejohn, Religion in
the Burger Court: The Heritage of Mr. Justice Black, 10 IND. L REV. 645 (1977).
rights .... " 1 3 What Black did say, in his 1968 news interview,
was quite the contrary: "I did not say that our entire Bill of
Rights is an absolute. I said there are absolutes in our Bill of
Rights."14 (Mrs. Elizabeth Black also flags Magee's error in her
Memorial Portrait of the Justice)15
Properly stated, Magee's focus is on Mr. Justice Black's "consti-
tutional jurisprudence" concerning primarily the freedom of
speech and press provisions of the first amendment. Within the
book's six chapters, Magee acquaints the reader with how Black
understood freedom of expression "absolutism,"16 how that un-
derstanding relied on historical considerations, 17 how and in what
respects that absolutism was antithetical to a "balancing" ap-
proach,18 how Black developed this theory of "absolutism," 9 and
finally, what dilemmas an absolutist approach to freedom of ex-
pression issues posed for the Justice in his closing years on the
Court.20
Overall, the first two chapters are well presented, laying bare
the fundamentals of Justice Black's absolutism concerning free-
dom of expression questions. Describing Justice Black's ap-
proach, Professor Magee notes:
Literalism involved a process of employing standards-the words of the
Constitution-for determining constitutional rights. Absolutism and liter-
alism ... were intimately intertwined, for the foundation of Justice
Black's belief that the First Amendment is an absolute was primarily the
literal command "Congress shall make no law." But, whereas absolutism
was only a standard of enforcement, literalism-besides being a justifica-
tion for absolutism-also involved the complex task of ascertaining the
meaning of the rights and freedoms outlined in the Bill of Rights. 21
This was Black's methodology for arriving at standards of consti-
tutional objectivity that would check unwarranted judicial discre-
tion, while lending a healthy measure of predictability and
certainty to the law.22
Magee advances a worthwhile argument by redirecting atten-
tion to one thorny branch of this approach: "In Justice Black's lit-
eral construction the major task is set aside-that of defining
words and phrases over which there is considerable dispute, even
13. MAGEE, supra note 5, at 8.
14. CBS news special interview with Eric Sevareid and Martin Agronsky, re-
printed in Justice Black and the Bill of Rights, 9 Sw. U. L REV. 937, 938 (1977).
15. Black, Hugo Black A Memorial Portrait, YEARBOOK OF THE SUPREME
COURT HIsTORIcAL SocIETY (1982).
16. MAGEE, supra note 5, at 29-63.
17. Id. at 32-48.
18. Id. at 11-15, 98, 128-33, 138.
19. Id. at 99-143.
20. Id. at 144-81.
21. Id. at 15.
22. See id. at 119, 145, 194.
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among absolutists."23 One example is Alexander Meiklejohn's
distinction between "speech" and "freedom of speech" as worded
in the first amendment.24 That shade of difference proved to be of
little or no moment to the "literalist" Alabaman. Nor did Black
ever craft any truly convincing definitional guidelines to explain
why expression like symbolic speech should not be entitled to ab-
solute, or even near absolute protection.25 Is this perhaps a case
of Black logomachy?
Equally proficuous is Magee's sketch of the role of history in
Black's science of law. History, contended Franklin Roosevelt's
first appointee, provided yet another justification for resort to an
absolutist approach to constitutional decision-making. On this
matter Magee tracks the various historical arguments of Chafee,
Corwin, Leonard Levy, and others concerning the Framers' origi-
nal intent regarding freedom of expression. 26 The author offers
ample evidence that Black's first amendment historical argu-
ments were, at best, problematic.27
More damaging still, as far as fourteenth amendment incorpora-
tion is concerned, is the evidence Magee tenders suggesting that
"the First Amendment was in fact jurisdictional, and thus aimed
specifically at the federal government's authority over the matter
of freedom of expression."28 Quite correctly, then, Magee in-
quires: "As a restriction on federal power vis-A-vis the power of
the states, how can the First Amendment apply to the states at
all?9"29
Chapters three through five provide perhaps the most engross-
ing sections of the book. Essentially, Magee opines that the de-
velopment of Black's absolutist interpretation of the first
amendment's restraints on government may be divided into the
following three periods: (1) 1937-49, during which Justice Black
adhered to a "preferred position" approach to free expression
questions; (2) 1949-62, characterized by the announcement of ab-
solutism and its liberal application; and (3) 1962-71, marked by a
period of retreat in applying absolutist arguments to "symbolic
23. Id. at 24.
24. Id. at 23.
25. Cf. Yarbrough, Justice Black & His Critics on Speech-Plus & Symbolic
Speech, 52 TEx. L. REV. 257 (1974).
26. MAGEE, supra note 5, at 50-63.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 57-60.
29. Id. at 60.
speech" and what is referred to as "speech plus."30
Magee's conclusions do not mark the final word on this particu-
lar subject. Even so, it cannot be gainsaid that he has made any-
thing less than "clear and convincing" arguments in defense of
his general position. For example, Magee offers intellectually se-
ductive support for the contention that the Black of the first pe-
riod was not hostile to all types of balancing nor even to that
variation of balancing known as the "clear and present danger"
test.3 1 Likewise, the Black of the formative years was willing to
exclude certain kinds of pure speech (e.g. commercial speech)
from the ambit of absolute protection.3 2 The dissenting rhetoric
of the later years covered these and other early opinions much
like newly fallen snow conceals rugged brush.
The issue, of course, is not whether the Justice was adroit or
lofty, for certainly he was both. Rather the focal concern is with
the intellectual design which the maturing Black selected to con-
struct the edifice of his constitutional thought. Serious study of
the myriad of Black opinions alerts us to several constitutional
signposts that lie at the crossroads of his thought. Thus under-
stood, there is a real intellectual temptation to concur with Pro-
fessor Magee that slight as it was, Black's juristic turn to
absolutism in this penultimate period came following the deaths
of Justices Murphy and Rutledge and upon the arrival of the Den-
nis3 3 decision. A decade later in his celebrated Konigsberg v.
State Bar dissent,3 4 Black lamented what he viewed as the "sud-
den transformation of the 'clear and present danger test' in Den-
nis v. United States."35 Accordingly, and as Magee accurately
emphasizes, Black's Dennis dissent stressed that his "basic disa-
greement with the Court... [sprang] from a fundamental differ-
ence in constitutional approach."3 6 That fundamental difference,
it seems, marked the initial phase of Black's open adoption of
absolutism.3 7
According to Magee, the last period (1962-71) commenced with
Arthur Goldberg assuming the Frankfurter seat. It was during
the 1960s-the heyday of the Warren Court-urges Magee, that
30. Id. at 64-67.
31. See id. at 86-93. See generally Linde, Clear & Present Danger Reexamined.
Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L REV. 1163, 1174-82 (1970) (ar-
guing that the first amendment is correctly understoodfirst as a direction to legis-
lators rather than to judges deciding cases upon subsequent review).
32. See MAGEE, supra note 5, at 96-97.
33. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
34. 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961).
35. Id. at 64.
36. MAGEE, supra note 5, at 105 quoting 341 U.S. at 579 (Black, J., dissenting).
37. See MAGEE, supra note 5, at 101, 111-19.
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"[a] change in Justice's Black's attitude toward dissent and pro-
test no doubt occurred."38 What is commonly viewed as Black's
conservative years came during this period, primarily in response
to symbolic speech questions and demonstration cases. In his
1968 book, A Constitutional Faith,39 Black offered the following
reply to his critics: "In giving absolute protection to free speech,
... I have always been careful to draw a line between speech and
conduct."40
Professor Magee submits challenging arguments refuting much
of Black's position regarding his alleged fidelity to these distinc-
tions.41 One of Magee's more telling arguments is his cautious
critique of Black's opinion in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co.,42 an oft-cited case presented as evidence that Black early
along subscribed to a clear speech-conduct distinction. Not with-
out merit, Professor Magee's study of the case concludes:
(1) the opinion does not in fact articulate any lucid distinction
between constitutionally protected speech and conduct; (2) the
opinion may be understood to afford constitutional protection on
the basis of the content of the message delivered; and (3) the
Giboney rationale is difficult to square with Black's absolutist
treatment of libel laws affecting freedom of speech.43
A number of the preceding arguments differ from those ad-
vanced by Professor Yarbrough.44 With the publication of this
book, I believe, Professor Magee has shifted the burden of proof
to Professor Yarbrough to demonstrate the consistency of Mr.
Justice Black's views concerning freedom of expression. This un-
dertaking would be salutary, at least in perpetuating the kind of
discussion Black most assuredly thought the first amendment
protected absolutely.
Before shelving Magee's Mr. Justice Black, I think it well to reg-
ister a few comments about several of the book's shortcomings.
First, the author's treatment of Korematsu v. United States45
holds the case up against the backdrop of Black's absolutism,
38. Id. at 152.
39. H. BLAcK, A CONSTFIruIONAL FArrH (1969).
40. Id. at 53.
41. MAGEE, supra note 5, at 160-73.
42. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
43. MAGEE, supra note 5, at 164-66.
44. See note 25 supra. See also Yarbrough, Justice Black, The First Amend-
men, & the Burger Court, 46 Miss. L.J. 203 (1975).
45. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
when the opinion is more clearly explainable as being cut from
the cloth of Black's equal protection jurisprudence.46
Second, Dunne v. United States47 is offered as evidence that
Black's initial views on the first amendment and the Smith Act
were different than his later ones expressed in Dennis. Magee
hinges this argument on the assumption that Black joined the
1943 majority in denying certiorari in Dunne, and "thereby upheld
the provisions of the Smith Act."48 Against Magee's assumption
stands the bold statement of Justice Douglas: "Black voted to
grant the petition."49
Still other oversights warrant mention. The Justice's 1947
Adamson v. California dissentO is wedged into the absolutist pe-
riod of Black's jurisprudence, the period which according to
Magee did not begin until two years later in 1949. Chronologi-
cally, Black's Adamson dissent is a child of what Magee labels as
the first period. Ironically then, the Adamson dissent may lend
some support for the contrary position, namely, that Black's abso-
lutism traced back beyond Dennis in 1951.
Additionally, the author contends that Justice Black "devoted
much of the remainder of his judicial life to condemning, as in-
consistent with the idea of a written constitution, the very reason-
ing employed to reach the result in Korematsu."51 That is a
questionable proposition, particularly in light of the Justice's reaf-
firmation of Korematsu a few years prior to his death.52
Finally, it is rather curious that Magee altogether sets aside
Black's 1957 due process grounded opinion in Konigsberg v. State
Bar.53 Regrettably, Magee does not even hint at the remarkable
1971 trilogy of Bar admission cases.54 Similarly, Black's some-
what surprising dissent in Amalgamated Food Employees Union
v. Logan Plaza55 does not win so much as a single line of footnote
space.
Mr. Justice Black is surely the kind of book that should be
pondered by anyone genuinely interested in freedom of expres-
46. See Yarbrough, supra note 9.
47. 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943).
48. MAGEE, supra note 5, at 105-06 (footnote omitted).
49. Douglas, supra note 1, at 94 (emphasis added).
50. 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
51. MAGEE, supra note 5, at 71.
52. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1971, at 76, col. 8.
53. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
54. See Baird v. Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Law
Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971). On the earlier Bar
admission cases, see Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases, 21 LAW IN TRAN-
SrON 155 (1961); Dilliard, Mr. Justice Black and In re Anastaplo, 9 Sw. U. L Rev.
953 (1977).
55. 391 U.S. 308, 327 (1968).
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sion issues specifically, or in judicial constitutional decision-mak-
ing generally. It is perhaps one kind of book that Mr. Justice
Powell, the "balancer" and successor to Black, might do well to
peruse. For that matter, it is a book that appellate judges should
be introduced to, if only to call attention to the significance of a
principled and thoughtful approach to decision-making-an ap-
proach intellectually unequaled by many of the now fashionable,
so-called "ad hoc" weighing of interests formulae.56
I have made the argument before:57 One can learn a great deal
about a judge by reading through the published reports58 with
care and attention. This is true in part because a truly great ap-
pellate judge, from the federal or state court bench, devotes much
care and attention to crafting published opinions. Magee's study,
whatever its failures may be, unquestionably fosters respect for
Black's judicial legacy by setting out to examine the Justice's
published opinions with some care and attention. Hopefully, fu-
ture studies will be the product of nothing less than an equal
measure of this kind of scholarship.
Charles Reich put it best: "The Supreme Court was designed
for giants."59 However one assesses Mr. Justice Black, he was in-
deed a "giant."60 Even as strong a critic as the late Alexander
Bickel admitted, "[He was] without a doubt a figure of the first
importance in the history of the Court."61 James Magee's book,
though flawed in places, certainly can assist future generations in
56. Cf. Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L REV. 565, 609-17 (1980); Shif-
frin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech & First Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A.
L REV. 915, 955-63 (1978). For a trenchant and pragmatic general reply to such ar-
guments, see State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 835, 869-72, 618 P.2d 423, 440-42 (1980)
(Linde, J., dissenting). See also Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitu-
tion, 76 HARV. L REV. 673, 736-44 (1963).
57. Collins, Book Review, 15 Stan. Law. 39 (Winter/Spring, 1979-80).
58. This is not to be understood, however, as suggesting that cases are the
only places where a scholar, as distinguished from "reporters" of the Woodward
and Armstrong variety, may search. That is, "Itihere is a clear need for scholars
to expand their conception of the role of Supreme Court Justices .... Thus, stud-
ies that concentrate only on formal judicial behavior risk missing some of the most
revealing actions of members of the Court." See Murphy, Elements of Extrajudi-
cial Strategy: A Look at the Political Roles of Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter,
69 GEo. LJ. 101, 128 (1980); Levy & Murphy, Preserving The Progressive Spirit in a
Conservative Time: The Joint Reform Efforts of Justice Brandeis and Professor Fe-
lix Frankfurter, 1916-1933, 78 MICH. L REV. 1252 (1981).
59. Collins, The Next Reich, 2 NAT'L LJ. 1, 25 (1980) (interview with Charles
Reich).
60. See Frank, Hugo L. Black- He Has Joined the Giants, 58 A.BA. J. 21 (1972).
61. A. BiCKEi, THE LEAST DANGERous BRANCH 85 (1962).
appreciating-even in a constitutionally changing world-some-
thing of the great stature of one of the last "giants" to hold the
title "Mr. Justice."
